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THE QUASI-CONTRACTUAL REMEDY IN CASES OF EXPRESS CONTRACT 
INDUCED BY FRAUD 
Legal duties are created by society for any sort of reason that seems 
good to society. Thus, where a harmful act has been done by the 
defendant with resulting profit to himself, the law can declare that 
these facts shall operate to create either a duty in the defendant to 
make good to the plaintiff for all thz damage suffered by him or a duty 
in the defendant to restore to the plaintiff the amount of the profit 
wrongfully received by the defendant. Both of these alternative duties 
are secondary, remedial duties, created to redress the wrong done by a 
tortious act. The first is the duty that is enforced in the more common 
of tort actions like trespass and case. The second has come to be called 
a quasi-contractual duty, chiefly because the form of action in which 
it was recognized and enforced was assumpsit; by the use of fiction- 
so common in the growth of our law-the tort was said to be waived 
and a contract to be implied by the law. The use of the language of 
-iction, such as this, might well be expected to result in error and con- 
fusion. Such a result is made almost certain by the prevailing 
ignorance of the history and character of the common-law forms of 
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action and by the failure to make an analysis of such a complex legal 
concept as "contract" into simpler and more fundamental concepts. 
In the case of Prest v. Farmington (i9i8, Me.) io4 Atl. 52I, the 
plaintiff sued f'or the reasonable value of work and labor performed 
for the defendant, and to a plea by the defendant that the work was 
done under express contract replied that the contract was induced by 
the defendant's fraud. It was held that the plaintiff could recover 
nothing beyond the agreed contract price, even though he could have 
recovered more in an action of deceit and even though the reasonable 
value to the defendant of the work done by the plaintiff was more 
than the agreed price. The court expressly says that in such a case 
"indebitatus assumpsit" lies only for the contract price; that "Where 
the parties have made a contract for themselves covering the whole 
subject-matter, no promise is implied by the law"; and that "The duty 
to pay damages for a tort does not imply a promise to pay them, upon 
which assumpsit can be maintained." 
The decision in this case can well be sustained for another reason 
given by the court, that the plaintiff had discovered the fraud at an 
early stage in the work and that his conduct since that time amounted 
to a ratification of the express contract. The same can be said of some 
of the cases cited by the court as authority.' As to, the other reasons, 
however, there must be vigorous dissent. 
Indebitatus assumpsit is substantially identical with the action of 
debt. To maintain either action at common law, it was necessary to 
prove that the defendant had received a quid pro quo, and in both 
actions the measure of recovery was the value of that quid pro quo. 
Such value, however, might have been fixed at a liquidated sum by 
the parties, and this sum would then be the measure of recovery. In 
neither form of action was it necessary to prove an express promise 
by the defendant. 
The action of assumpsit was the form to be used in any case where 
the defendant had made an actual promise for a consideration, even 
though this consideration did not consist of a quid pro quo received 
by the defendant and even though he had promised no liquidated sum. 
As long as this form of action was a true action of trespass on the case, 
the measure of recovery was the damage suffered by the plaintiff, the 
amount by which his estate had been decreased by his giving the con- 
sideration; but by an unconscious process it departed from its tort 
parent, and the measure of recovery came to be the value of the thing 
promised, the amount by which the plaintiff's estate would have been 
increased by complete performance. 
It is obvious that there was a large field in which the two forms of 
action overlapped, but each had its distinct and separate field also: 
1Ferguson v. Carrington (i829, K. B.) 9 B. & C. 59. Seiway v. Fogg (I83g,. 
Exch.) 5 M. & W. 83. 
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debt would lie in many cases where the defendant had never promised 
to pay, either expressly or by implication in fact; and assumpsit would 
lie even though the defendant had never received a quid pro quo and 
had not agreed to pay a liquidated sum of money. 
The statement of the court in Prest v. Farmington that "Where the 
parties have made a contract for themselves, covering the whole 
subject-matter, no promise is implied by law" is one of those glittering 
generalities of which our legal literature is so full. It can be found 
repeated in scores of cases,2 and in a considerable number it has caused 
an erroneous and unjust decision. In its proper signification it means 
no more than that when two parties are contracting expressly they 
are not contracting tacitly, that when parties reduce their agreement 
to words their mutual intentions will be determined by those words. 
and not by mere inferences from other conduct. Where there is an 
express contract no other should be implied in fact.3 This rule is 
properly applied in all cases where the legally operative facts are the 
words of agreement, even though the plaintiff may be seeking a remedy 
in an action of debt or indebitatus assumpsit.4 Where the remedy on 
the express contract has been barred by the statute of limitations, the 
law will not construct a quasi-contractual debt in order to avoid the 
effect of the statute.5 But on the other hand, there are many classes of 
cases where a quasi-contractual debt was constructed by the law in 
spite of the existence of an express agreement. Such is the case 
where the express contract is unenforceable because of the statute of 
frauds ;6 or because of illegality, the plaintiff not being in pari delicto;7 
or even because of the non-fulfillment of some condition precedent by 
2Phelps v. Sheldon (1832, Mass.) IQ Pick. 52; Whiting v. Sullivan (i8Io} 
7 Mass. I07; Steam Mill Co. v. Westervelt (i877) 67 Me. 446, 449; Stockett v. 
Watkins (i830, Md.) 2 Gill & J. 326, 34I ("The law sometimes implies con- 
tracts, but never where there is an express contract") ; Walker v. Brown 
(i826) 28 Ill. 378, 383 ("As in physics two solid bodies cannot occupy the same 
space at the same time, so in law and common sense there cannot be an express 
and an implied contract for the same thing existing at the same time") ; Young 
v. Hill (0876) 67 N. Y. i62, I74 ("there being an express contract for the pay- 
ment of the debt . . . the law will not imply another and a different agree- 
ment for the same purpose. Expressumn facit cessare taciturn"). 
8 So the doctrine may very properly be applied where a workman sues for an 
additional sum over and above that for which he expressly agreed to do the 
work. Waite v. Merrill (i826) 4 Me. i02; Massachusetts General Hospital v. 
Fairbanks (i88o) i29 Mass. 78; Phelps v. Sheldon, suprc; Walker v. Brown, 
supra; Cutter v. Powell (I795, K. B.) 6 T. R. 320; Ladd v. Bean (i9i8, Me.) 
I04 AtI. 8I4. 
4Steam Mill Co. v. Westervelt, supra. 
6 Woodruff v. Moore (1850, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 8 Barb. I7I; Blanchard v. Blan- 
chard (I91 I) 20i N. Y. 134, 94 N. E. 630. 
'Richards v. Allen (i840) I7 Me. 296; Cromwell v. Norton (igo6) I93 Mass. 
29I, 79 N. E. 433. 
"Eastern etc. Metal Co. v. Webb (0907) 195 Mass. 356, 8i N. E. 251; Webb 
v. Fulchire (i843) 25 N. C. 485. 
i8 
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the plaintiff himself.8 Therefore, the mere existence of an express 
contract is not itself a sufficient reason for refusing to recognize 
a non-contract debt based upon the unjust enrichment of the defendant. 
Such enrichment is an additional fact to be given an operative effect 
different from that of the contract itself; the words of the parties are 
not the only operative facts to be considered. 
Where the defendant has committed a tort, thereby enriching him- 
self at the plaintiff's expense, there are numerous classes of cases 
where the plaintiff is given an alternative remedy. He can recover 
damages in a tort action, measured by the loss he has suffered and 
without reference to the gain of the defendant; or he can sue in 
indebitatus assumpsit for the amount of the defendant's wrongful 
gain. If he chooses the latter remedy, he is said to "waive the tort.", 
This is so well established that the citation of cases is hardly neces- 
sary.10 It is not material by what particular kind of a tort the defend- 
ant enriched himself; the rule is everywhere applied where the tort 
consisted of fraud and deceit.1" 
This being the case, there should be no variation in the application 
of the rule even though the deceit or fraud occurred in the formation 
of a contract. In such a case the tortious acts of the defendant 
should operate as follows: the plaintiff should have the legal privilege 
of not performing his part, and the legal power of rescission; or he 
can enforce a secondary right to damages for breach of contract in 
case the defendant fails to perform as agreed; or he can maintain 
suit for damages in the tort action of trespass on the case; or he can 
repudiate the contract, waive the tort, and sue in indebitatus assumpsit 
8 Oxendale v. Wetherell (i829, K. B.) 9 B. & C. 386; Wolfe v. Howes (i859) 
20 N. Y. I97. 
'This is really a misdescription; for whichever remedy the plaintiff chooses, 
the tort is still one of the operative facts and must be proved. In indebitatus 
assumpsit, however, an additional operative fact must be proved-the quid pro 
,quo or enrichment of the defendant. 
1'See Arthur L. Corbin, Waiver of Tort and Suit in Assumpsit (i9io) i9 
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 22I. The plaintiff is given a similar choice of remedies in 
cases where the defendant has committed a breach of contract, enriching him- 
self at the plaintiff's expense. Snow v. Prescott (i842) I2 N. H. 535; Clark 
v. Manchester (i872) 5i N. H. 594. The choice is between express assumpsit 
for damages suffered and debt (or indebitatus assumpsit) for value received. 
11 This is universally true where the defendant obtained money from the 
plaintiff by fraud. No court doubts that the plaintiff can recover this money in 
indebitatus assumpsit, even though he might in the alternative have sued on the 
express contract or in tort for damages. Morison v. Thompson (i874) L. R. 
9 Q. B. 480; Steiner v. Clisby (i894) I03 Ala. i8i, I5 So. 6I2; Byard v. Holmes 
(i868) 33 N. J. L. Ii9. 
Even where the defendant received value in goods or labor instead of money, 
authority is ample to sustain counts for work and labor and for goods sold. 
Fenemore v. U. S. (1797, U. S.) 3 Dall. 357 (stock obtained by fraud); Corbin, 
Waiver of Tort (i9io) I9 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 22I, passim. 
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for the value unjustly received by the defendant. Bringing suit in 
this last form is not a ratification of the express contract, as some 
courts have believed,12 because it is an action of debt based upon the 
receipt of a quid pro quo and not upon mutual assent. The better 
considered authorities hold that the unjust enrichment of the defendant 
added to his tortious act operates to create a non-contract debt in the 
plaintiff's favor.'8 
It should be observed that this is not inconsistent with the court's 
statement in Prest v. Farmington that "the duty to pay damages for 
a tort does not imply a promise to pay them upon which assumpsit 
can be maintained."' No doubt this statement is strictly correct in 
its exact form. Damages for a tort cannot now be recovered in 
assumpsit, even though assumpsit was originally a tort action for 
damages. But the receipt and the unjust retention of benefits result- 
ing from the tort are separate operative facts, and these are amply 
sufficient as a basis for the action of debt or its actual equivalent 
indebitatus assumpsit. This is not an action for damages for a tort; 
for those damages are measured by the amount subtracted from the 
plaintiff's estate. Nor is it an action for damages for breach of con- 
tract; for those damages would be measured by the value of the 
performance promised by the defendant. Instead, it is an action of 
debt based upon the receipt of a quid pro quo by the defendant, which 
under the existing circumstances creates a non-contractual duty in the 
defendant to pay back the value received. To enforce this duty, 
indebitatus assumpsit was the proper form of action at common law; 
under the codes of procedure the duty is the same, to be enforced by 
"(civil action." 
A.L. C. 
12Ferguson v. Carrington, supra; Kellogg v. TurPie (i879) 93 Ill. 265. 
sRoth v. Palmer (i858, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 27 Barb. 652; Crown Cycle Co. v. 
Brown (1901) 39 Or. 285, 64 Pac. 451; Diet's Assignee v. Sutcliffe (i883) 
8o Ky. 650; Kayser v. Sichel (i86i, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 34 Barb. 84. 
"The court cites Cooper v. Cooper (i888) i47 Mass. 370, 17 N. E. 892, a case 
that has been shown most convincingly to be erroneous. See Keener, Quasi- 
Contracts, 321-326. Though followed in Payne's Appeal (i895) 65 Conn. 397, 
32 Ati. 948, and in Graham v. Stanton (i90i) I77 Mass. 32I, 58 N. E. i023, 
there are several decisions contra. Fox v. Dawson (i82o, La.) 8 Mart 94; 
Higgins v. Breen (i845) 9 Mo. 497. See Woodward, Quasi-Contracts, sec. i84 
THE COLLECTION OF ROYALTIES FROM THE SUB-ASSIGNEE OF A COPYRIGHT 
In Barker v. Stickney (i9i8, K. B.) ii9 L. T. 73, the plaintiff was 
the owner of a copyright which he assigned to P, the latter under- 
taking to pay a royalty. P became insolvent, and his receiver sold all 
his assets to the defendant, who took an assignment of the copyright 
and agreed to pay the royalty. The owner then sued for royalties 
